Перевод "viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ"

Автор Ассаджи, 10:05 27 января 2004

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В недавнем письме Майкл Олдс предложил интересное объяснение термина "винняна анидассана".

Переводя "винняна" как "re-knowing knowing", он пишет:

It is essential to this notion of a re-knowing knowing that cannot be
pointed out that it remain without "descriptors". This is because that which
is used as a descriptor is made in the "mental" side of the two-sided beast
that is the interoperation of the mental and the material that is the basis
for the senses. Like a mirror, when a thing is conceptualized in the mental
side, there is automatically formed a corresponding "thing" in the material
side. In other words, conceptualized through the senses [in this case "the
mind" of the individual], that is, described as a "thing" (and a "state" is
a "thing") the re-knowing knowing of the Arahant is always [must always be] being wrongly described. Since there is no other way to describe a thing, it must remain undescribed.

Таким же образом можно объяснить и невозможность описания Ниббаны в утвердительных терминах -- любое подобное описание сводит её в прокрустово ложе связки "нама-рупа", где ум распознает и категоризирует элементы опыта.


Что-то вне контекста, Ваша цитата не очень понятна. :)
На правах рекламы


Цитата: AlertЧто-то вне контекста, Ваша цитата не очень понятна. :)

Вот контекст:

Greetings! As some of you know, I have been digging into the notion of
Vinnana Anidassana for some time now. This is my take:

Tracing things back from our visible world by way of finding it's essential
dependancies, we see that growing old and dying depend on the fact of birth.
Without birth there would be no getting old and dying.
Birth depends on the fact of life itself. If there were no such thing as
"Life" in any form anywhere, then there could be no birth.
Life depends on the animation known as "going after getting" and "going
after getting away from." If there were no activity in the form of
attempting to get or get away, then there would be no living.
Activitiy in the pursuit of getting and getting away depends on the fact of
wanting. If there were no wanting to get or wanting to get away, there would
be no attempting to get or attempting to get away.
Wanting depends on sense experience in the form of pleasant sensation,
unpleasant sensation, and sensation that is neither pleasant nor unpleasant.
If there were no sensations there would be no wanting to get or wanting to
get away.
Sensations depend on the mechanisms of sensation-production: the organ of
sense, the object of sense, the contact of the two, and the sensation,
perception, and consciousness that arises from the conjunction of the three
(sense organ, sense object, and mechanism of consciousness). If there were
no mechanism of sensation-production, then there would be no sense
The Mechanisms of sensation-production depend on the inter-operation of the
mental and the material. If there were no inter-operation of the mental and
the material, there would be no mechanism for sensation production.
The interoperation of the Mental and Material depends on the ability to
re-know knowing. If there were no ability to re-know knowing, then there
would be no interoperation of the Mental and Material.
The ability to re-know knowing depends on the interoperation of the Mental
and Material. If there were no interoperation of the Mental and Material,
there would be no re-knowing knowing.

So it can be seen at this point that re-knowing knowing depends on the
interoperation of the mental and the material, and the interoperation of the
mental and the material depends on re-knowing knowing. The one doubles back
on the other.

It is because individuals do not see the outcome in aging and death, and
because they do not see the origin of that aging and death in the wanting
that is connected to the re-knowing of knowing sense experiences, and
because they do not see the ending of that aging and death in the ending of
that wanting that is connected to the re-knowing of knowing sense
experiences, that they take action to get or get away from in the form of
identification with intentional acts (to get or get away from) of body,
speech and mind. If individuals saw the outcome as aging and death, if they
saw the origin as wanting, if they saw the ending as the ending of that
wanting, there would be no taking action to get or get away from and there
would be no resultant identification found in the outcome. This is the
meaning of: Depending on Blindness [a = not; vijja = vision]; Confounded
Identification [sangkhara = sang = own, with; khara= making].

This blindness takes the form of points of view about existance and
non-existance. Put in first-level terms, it is the point of view that "I am"
or "It is my."

The inter-operation of the mental and the material in what is subjectively
understood to be the present moment is producing sensations, perceptions,
and re-knowing knowing carrying with it [from it's previously having been
implanted there by identification with intentional acts of body, speech and
mind] the notion "I am" or "It is my." Re-knowing the knowing of that,
depending on the now current point of view of the individual, this notion is
accepted or not accepted. Accepted it produces a tendancy to react.
Reacting, it produces another "round." Rejected, it does not produce any
tendancy to react. Not reacting, nothing is produced.

This "re-knowing the knowing" of the personalized [carrying with it the
notion of "I am" from the point of it's being previously intentionally set
rolling] "re-knowing knowing" produced by the inter-operation of the mental
and the material in the present moment is what is known as "Vinnana
Anidassananam," the re-knowing knowing that cannot be seen or pointed out.

It is essential to this notion of a re-knowing knowing that cannot be
pointed out that it remain without "descriptors". This is because that which
is used as a descriptor is made in the "mental" side of the two-sided beast
that is the interoperation of the mental and the material that is the basis
for the senses. Like a mirror, when a thing is conceptualized in the mental
side, there is automatically formed a corresponding "thing" in the material
side. In other words, conceptualized through the senses [in this case "the
mind" of the individual], that is, described as a "thing" (and a "state" is
a "thing") the re-knowing knowing of the Arahant is always [must always be]
being wrongly described. Since there is no other way to describe a thing, it
must remain undescribed.

Attempting a description of the re-knowing knowing of the Arahant is the
error of those who maintain an on-going "Pure Mind", or "Buddha Mind": they
have conceptualized the unconceptualizable. They have made the Unborn,
Unmade, Undying, etc into existing states and have consequently bound
themselves to the attainment of such a "thing". Attaining such a thing is
attaining a "state" and as such is attaining something that will end and as
such is not the goal.

We must be satisfied to let well-enough alone. Let go of what we can know is
going to result in Pain, and the rest will take care of itself.

Say I.

Best Wishes!
Michael Olds


По поводу "виннянам анидассанам" я завел тему на форуме DhammaWheel:



Сильвестр пишет:

Grumble, grumble. Every time I see that "vinnanam anidassanam" canvassed by Ajahn Thanissaro, I succumb to domanassa. Is there no escape from even this Upanishadic "Sat"-style consciousness surviving post-mortem in Nibbana-Without-Residue? Even Gombrich (citing Sue Hamilton) takes the plain old grammatical reading of vinnanam anidassanam as "Consciousness has no attribute"; p.44 of his Conditioned Genesis. I'm sure it should read as "[Where] consciousness has no attribute", but that would disturb the Pali metre for the verse.

For those who read the footnotes to his translation ( http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.038.than.html ), there are a couple of points that are important to consider -

1. Was the Buddha referring to "consciousness which is conditionally arisen" (the 1st syntax pattern) or was the Buddha referring to "consciousness that is conditionally arisen" (the 2nd syntax pattern)? See his footnote 2:-

ЦитироватьAt any rate, the substantive difference in these two patterns is that the first could be taken as implying that all consciousness is dependently co-arisen, whereas the second states explicitly that the Buddha's words, "Apart from condition there is no origination of consciousness," apply specifically to one type of consciousness — consciousness arising in dependence on the co-arising of conditions — leaving open the possibility that there is another type of consciousness to which these words do not apply.

In the first case, "which is" forms a non-restrictive adjunct (ie a nexus) that is predicated by all the nouns in that class. In the second case, "that is" forms a restrictive adjunct (ie a junction) that modifies some of the nouns in that class.

What Ajahn Thanissaro missed was that the 2nd possibility could have been expressly allowed by the Buddha, had the Buddha phrased the proposition thus-

Цитировать'Aññatra paccayā n'atthi paṭiccasamuppannanassa viññāṇassa sambhavoti

ie "Apart from [requisite] conditions, there is no coming into play of dependently arisen consciousness".

The fact remains that the Buddha did not restrict His observation to consciousness that is dependently arisen, but to consciousness in toto. The in toto treatment is seen in the Buddha's statement -

Цитировать'Aññatra paccayā n'atthi viññāṇassa sambhavoti

There is no adjective paṭiccasamuppanna standing in a junction relation to the noun vinnana to modify that noun. Ergo, there is no consciousness that is not dependently arisen.

2. His critique of the MLDB translation

ЦитироватьThe translators of MLDB consistently follow the first pattern in rendering this sentence: "Misguided man, have I not stated in many ways consciousness to be dependently arisen since without a condition there is no origination of consciousness?" (It might be noted that this rendering inserts a "since" where there is none in the Pali, and ignores the quotation marks (ti) around the sentence beginning, "Apart from" or "without.")

Whether or not "since" was used, or "such that" was used, one is perfectly entitled to ignore the iti clitics and translate the clitic as such. I mentioned recently that Pali, like other Middle Indo Aryan languages, use the iti clitic as an object/subject complementiser. Specifically, the Pali Canon seems to reserve the iti clitic to perform this function when a Truth/sacca is the object of a verb.

There, something off my chest.



Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation and notes from MN 49:

MN 49:

24. "'Good sir, if that is not partaken of by the allness of all, may it not turn out to be vacuous and empty for you!'

25. "'Consciousness non-manifesting,
Boundless, luminous all-round: [Note 513]

that is not partaken of by the earthness of earth, that is not partaken of by the waterness of water...[330]...that is not partaken of by the allness of all.'

Bhikkhu Bodhi:

In the first edition, I retained Ñanamoli's own translation of these lines, which read:

The consciousness that makes no showing,
Nor has to do with finiteness,
Not claiming being with respect to all.

In retrospect, I find this rendering far from satisfactory and thus here offer my own. These lines (which also appear as part of a full verse at DN 11.85/i.223) have been a perennial challenge to Buddhist scholarship, and even Ācariya Buddhaghosa seems to founder over them. MA takes the subject of the sentence to be Nibbāna, called "consciousness" (viññāṇaṁ) in the sense that "it can be cognized" (vijānitabbaṁ). This derivation is hardly credible, since nowhere in the Nik̄yas is Nibb̄ana described as consciousness, nor is it possible to derive an active noun from the gerundive. MA explains anidassanaṁ as meaning invisible, "because it (Nibbāna) does not come within range of eye-consciousness," but again this is a trite explanation. The word anidassana occurs at MN 21.14 in the description of empty space as an unsuitable medium for painting pictures; thus the idea seems to be that of not making manifest.

MA offers three explanations of sabbato pabhaṁ: (1) completely possessed of luminosity (pabhā); (2) possessing being (pabhū̇taṃ) everywhere; and (3) a ford (pabhaṁ) accessible from all sides, i.e., through any of the thirty-eight meditation objects. Only the first of these seems to have any linguistic legitimacy. Ñm, in Ms, explains that he takes pabhaṁ to be a negative present participle of pabhavati—apabhaṁ—the negative-prefix a dropping off in conjunction with sabbato: "The sense can be paraphrased freely by 'not predicating being in relation to "all,"' or 'not assuming of "all" that it is or is not in an absolute sense.'" But if we take pabhaṁ as "luminous," which seems better justified, the verse links up with the idea of the mind as intrinsically luminous (pabhassaram idaṁ cittaṁ , AN i.10) and also suggests the light of wisdom (pa), called the best of lights (AN ii.139). I understand this consciousness to be, not Nibbāna itself, but the arahant's consciousness during the meditative experience of Nibb̄na. See in this connection AN v.7–10, 318–26. Note that this meditative experience does not make manifest any conditioned phenomena of the world, and thus may be truly described as "non-manifesting."


DN 11, Walshe Translation:

But, monk, you should not ask your question in this way: 'Where do the four great elements — the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the air element — cease without remainder?' Instead, this is how the question should have been put:

'Where do earth, water, fire and air no footing find?
Where are long and short, small and great, fair and foul -
Where are "name-and-form" wholly destroyed?' [239]
And the answer is:
'Where consciousness is signless,[240] boundless, all-luminous, [241]
That's where earth, water, fire and air find no footing,
There both long and short, small and great, fair and foul -
There "name-and-form" are wholly destroyed.
With the cessation of consciousness this is all destroyed."" [242]

[239] Mind and body, i.e. 'subject and object' (Neumann quoted by RD).

[240] Anidassanaṁ: or 'invisible'. Ñāṇananda (n.242) renders it 'non-manifesting'.

[241] This word (pabhaṁ or pahaṁ) has been variously interpreted. DA takes it in the sense of a ford, or a place to enter the water 'accessible from all sides', by means of which one can reach Nibbana. There is an improbable suggestion that the meaning is 'rejecting', and Mrs Bennett translates the line: 'Where the consciousness that makes endless comparisons is entirely abandoned', which seems to involve a misunderstanding of anidassanaṁ. (But see next note). The same sequence also occurs at MN 49.11 rendered by I.B. Horner (MLS i, 392): 'Discriminative consciousness (= viññāṇaṁ) which cannot be characterised (= anidassanaṁ), which is unending, lucid in every respect (= sabbato pabhaṁ).' The two passages should be studied in conjunction. Cf. also AN 1.6: 'This mind (citta) is luminous, but is defiled by adventitious defilements.' See important discussion by Ñāṇananda, 57-63.

[242] G.C. Pande (Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, 92, n.21) says: 'Buddha says that the question should not be asked in the manner in which it is done in the prose quotation above, but thus — as in the metrical lines that follow. One may pertinently ask: "Why? what is wrong with the prose formulation?" The only answer would seem to be: "Nothing. But the verses have to be brought in!".
Ñāṇananda (Concept and Reality, 59) explains it thus: 'The last line of the verse stresses the fact that the four great elements do not find a footing — and that 'Name-and-Form' (comprehending them) can be cut-off completely — in that 'anidassana-viññāṇa' (the 'nonmanifestative consciousness') of the Arahant, by the cessation of his normal consciousness which rests on the data of sense-experience. This is a corrective to that monk's notion that the four elements can cease altogether somewhere — a notion which has its roots in the popular conception of self-existing material elements. The Buddha's reformulation of the original question and this concluding line are meant to combat this wrong notion.'


Короче говоря, словосочетание не вполне понятное, его можно истолковывать по-разному, и встречается оно один раз. Поэтому не стоит делать из него далеко идущие выводы.


Цитата: Ассаджи от 07:54 24 мая 2012
... и встречается оно один раз.
Встречается два раза.


Спасибо за уточнение. Встречается два раза - в


в одном и том же выражении:

'Viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ, anantaṃ sabbatopabhaṃ'.


Из Критического словаря:

a-nidassana, mfn , which cannot be characterized, (Ct.s invisible); DN I 223,12* (viññāṇaṁ ~aṁ; Sv: taṁ nidassanâbhāvato ~aṁ) = MN I 329,30 (Ps: cakkhuviññāṇassa āpāthaṁ anupagamanato ~aṁ nāma); MN I 127,36 (ākāso arūpī~o; Ps); Vibh 70,29

a-nidassana Dhs 597 (As 308,15); Dhs 585; 598 (quoted Pj II 211,18); 648 (As); 1088; Vibh 13,5; 64,5.
- n. synon, of Nibbāna, Abh 7; SN IV 370,12 (also title of the sutta, ib.);
- °-gāmi(n), mfn., leading to a°, ib.



Некоторые люди распускают слухи по поводу досточтимого Тханиссаро, утверждая, что он учит о неком "вечном сознании". Ничему подобному досточтимый Тханиссаро не учит.

Максимум, что он пишет:

What is not experienced through the earthness of earth (and so on through the list of categories up through the allness of the all) is nibbana, or unbinding. It is described in these terms because it is directly known, without intermediary of any sort.


This consciousness thus differs from the consciousness factor in dependent co-arising, which is defined in terms of the six sense media. Lying outside of time and space, it would also not come under the consciousness-aggregate, which covers all consciousness near and far; past, present, and future. And, as SN 35.23 notes, the word "all" in the Buddha's teaching covers only the six sense media, which is another reason for not including this consciousness under the aggregates. However, the fact that it is outside of time and space — in a dimension where there is no here, there, or in between (Ud I.10), no coming, no going, or staying (Ud VIII.1) — means that it cannot be described as permanent or omnipresent, terms that have meaning only within space and time.

Из примечаний к MN 49


The Buddha, knowing that there are two types of consciousness — the consciousness aggregate (viññāṇakkhandha), which is experienced in conjunction with the six sense media, and consciousness without surface (viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ), which is experienced independently of the six sense media...


Consciousness without surface (see note 1) is discussed explicitly only in passages where the Buddha is citing the superiority of his attainment over that of brahmas: In knowing this sort of consciousness, which performs no active role and lies outside of the term "all" (MN 49), he knows something that brahmas do not. At the same time, to lie outside of the consciousness aggregate, it would also have to lie outside of the dimensions of time and space, as that aggregate is defined as covering all consciousness "past, future, and present... far and near" (SN 22.59).

Из примечаний к МН 38


"The Buddha also says in some other passages that there's a consciousness that's known independently of the six sense spheres - That's the consciousness that's seen in awakening."

Из беседы http://www.dhammatalks.org/Archive/y2009/090415%20Faith%20in%20the%20Buddha%27s%20Awakening.mp3

Тут, конечно, есть с чем поспорить, однако истолковывать эти высказывания как этерналистские, на мой взгляд, недобросовестно.


Мнение Бхиккху Бодхи по этому поводу:

Bhikkhu Bodhi: Some contemporary interpreters of the Dhamma advance the position that nibbāna is an unconditioned dimension o f consciousness , but to maintain it they either have to insert words into their rendering of the verse that are not there in the Pali or construe the verse in a way that cannot be pegged to the actual wording of the text. The latter is what Buddhaghosa does. He identifies this viññāṇa with nibbāna, but he then says that nibbāna is here called viññāṇa in the sense that " it can be cognized " ( vijānitabbaṃ ). He does this because he knows well that nibb ā na cannot be the subject of cognition ; for according to the Theravada doctrinal system, nibbāna is the object of the path and fruition cittas. Yet Buddhaghosa's derivation, though ingenious, is not at all credible. Elsewhere in the texts, when viññāṇa is spoken of, it refers to the core of individual identity and to the subject of cognition, never to the object of cognition.


B. Alan Wallace : Again, I agree with you that nibbāna is not viññāṇa, but liberation must entail viññāṇa of nibbāna; and the crucial question is: with the death of an arahant, in which conditioned consciousness ceases, nibbāna does not cease ; and if nibbāna does not entail annihilation, then the awareness of nibbāna must continue, not with a conditioned viññāṇa, but with an unconditioned dimension of viññāṇa, presumably one that is "signless, boundless, and all - luminous. " Just as nibbāna is unborn and unceasing, the consciousness of it following the death of an arahant must also be unborn and unceasing.

BB: This would be a reasonable inference , but I have not found any passage in the texts that uses the word viññāṇa (or its cognates) in a way that affirms "an unconditioned dimension of viññāṇa." Since the verse occurs only once in the whole Pali Canon — with a citation of half the verse elsewhere (in MN 49 ) — and is not elaborated anywhere else, any interpretation of it involves some degree of conjecture. My own supposition is that the "signless, boundless, all - luminous consciousness " is the consciousness of the arahant when he enters the special samadhi in which he directly experiences nibbāna with full clarity. This special samadhi is referred to obliquely in various places in the Nikāyas . For example, several suttas in the last two books of the Anguttara Nikāya, at AN 10:6 (with a variant at 10:7) and at AN 11: 7, 8, 9 , speak about a monk entering a meditative state in which he is not cognizant of any of the phenomena of the world. Instead, it is said, he meditates on nibbāna as " the stilling of all conditioned things " and so forth . In the commentaries this state is called the meditative attainment of the fruit of arahantship (arahattaphalasamāpatti).


BB : The last statement resonates with the description of the anidassana - viññāṇa in the Dīgha sutta, but that consciousness is not described by any word that might be rendered " primordial. " Moreover, in the last line of the verse even that viññāṇa is said to cease ( I don't like Walshe's "is destroyed," which seems too violent) . On the whole, the conceptual framework underlying the Dzogchen passage is certainly very different from the framework one finds in the Pali discourses. For example, we don't find anything in the Pali texts that corresponds to " primordial consciousness ." The aggregate of consciousness is always distinguished into the six classes of consciousness, and consciousness is invariably held to be conditioned. See for instance MN no. 38, the Great Discourse on the Extinction of Craving:

"In many ways I have told you that consciousness is dependently arisen; there is no origination of consciousness apart from conditions. When consciousness arises dependent on some condition, it is reckoned on the basis of just that condition. (Illustrated by the six types arising on the basis of their faculty and object.) " ( Anekapariyāyena hi vo, bhikkhave, paṭiccasamuppannaṃ viññāṇaṃ vuttaṃ mayā , aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavoti ... Yaṃ yadeva, bhikkhave, paccayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati viññāṇaṃ, tena teneva viññāṇaṃ tveva saṅkhaṃ gacchati .)